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By RAYMoND L. YASSER*
INTRODUCTION
Multiplicity of ownership may well be, as E.B. White sug-
gested, I a prerequisite to a reliable and useful press in a demo-
cratic society. However, unless there is a radical change in the
law in this area, that necessary multiplicity may continue to
be "more dream than reality."'2
On June 12, 1978, the United States Supreme Court de-
cided Federal Communications Commission v. National Citi-
zen's Committee for Broadcasting.3 The Court held that future
"newspaper broadcast combinations" could not be created but
that established combinations would escape divestiture.' In
refusing to disturb -the concentration 5 of control of informa-
* Associate Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law. J.D. 1974, Duke Univer-
sity.
White, What E.B. White Told Xerox, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. (Sept./Oct. 1976)
at 53.
2 Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
3 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
Id. at 779.
This harmful concentration of control can take a number of forms. "Cross-
ownership" must be distinguished from multiple or group ownership. Cross-ownership
in this context denotes control of both print and broadcast facilities; multiple and
group ownership refers to owning more than one facility of the same type: two televi-
sion stations, for example. For a generally pro-industry discussion of the multiple
broadcast ownership problems: see P. CHERINGTON, L. HmscH & R. BRANIDWFN, TELEVI-
SION STATION OwNEsmp (1971).
This article will deal primarily with cross-ownership problems, although some
discussion of the problems of multiple ownership as it relates to the broader heading
of media concentration will also be included.
For documentation of the concentration phenomena, see Howard, Cross-Media
Ownership of Newspapers and TV Stations, 51 JouNAusM Q. 715 (1974); Sterling,
Trends in Daily Newspaper and Broadcast Ownership, 1922-1970, 52 JouRNALsM Q.
247 (1975); Comment, Concentration of Ownership of the Media of Mass Communica-
tion: An Examination of New FCC Rules on Cross Ownerships of Co-Located Newspa-
pers and Broadcast Stations, 1975 EMoRY L.J. 1121, 1121-23. See generally H. LamN,
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tional sources, the Court left intact more than 104 combina-
tions of print/broadcast media, affecting over 60 million
Americans.' Such a result is bound to have an adverse effect
on the flow of information to citizens of those affected commu-
nities, for it is clear that "the fewer voices you have in a com-
munity, the less chance you have of diversity and dissent."' It
is not surprising that this questionable decision has escaped
close scrutiny by the "mediacrats"' who were its primary
BROADCAST REGULATION AND JOINT OWNERSHIP OF MEDIA (1960); B. RucKER, THE FIRST
FREEDOM (1968); Gormley, How Cross Ownership Affects News Gathering, COLum.
JOuRNAUSM REV. 28 (May/June 1977); Johnson and Hoak, Media Concentration: Some
Observations and the United States' Experience, 56 IOWA L. REv. 267 (1970).
6 Gormley, supra note 5, at 28.
The statement was made by Nicholas Johnson, former FCC commissioner. See
Carmady, Challenging the Media Monopolies, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1977, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 24. See also Johnson, The Media Barons and the Public Interest, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, June 1968 at 39.
8 Credit for the term "mediacrats" belongs to Kevin Phillips, author of
MEDIACRACY: AMERICAN PARTIES AND POLITCS IN THE COMMUNICATIONS AGE. (1st ed.
1975). The mediacrats are indisputably powerful and influential.
There is no longer any doubt. Television's 1976 presidential debates, the
advent of Rupert Murdock, Jimmy Carter's dial a president show, and suc-
cess of the Great Gannett Money Machine have done it. As of mid-1977 the
issue of media power has come of age. Lingering attempts to dismiss "the
media" as an illegitimate issue born of hit and run politics and improper
English have all but drowned in the rising tide of national debate and con-
cern over "the media" as the decade's most notable economic, cultural, and
political phenomena.
Phillips, Busting the Media Trusts, HARPEaS, July, 1977, at 23.
The Washington Post, Time, Inc., CBS, ABC, RCA (Parent of NBC), and several
major book publishers are all numbered among America's 1,000 largest corporations.
Phillips, supra at 32.
" To get some idea of the extent to which one of these companies can make its
presence known in a given community, consider the Washington Post Co. The Com-
pany speaks with five tongues in Washington, D.C. The multi-tongued Company owns
and operates a newspaper (The Washington Post), a television station (WTOP-TV), a
radio station (WTOP), a major news service (Los Angeles Times-Washington Post),
and a major news magazine (NEWSWEEK). The Company, it can confidently be as-
serted, plays a huge role in shaping the capital's collective consciousness. Phillips,
supra at 30.
To get some idea of the extent to which one of these companies can make its
presence known nationally, consider the following facts about CBS, The New York
Times, and Time, Inc. from the article America's Press, U.S. NEWS AND WORW REPORT,
August 15, 1977, at 27:
CBS is a broadcast company that expanded into publishing. It owns five television
stations (in New York, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Saint Louis), seven
AM radio stations, and seven FM radio stations. CBS is also into book publishing. It
owns Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Popular Library Paperbacks, Gold Metal Paper-
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beneficiaries."9 This article is a chronicle of the history of this
curious decision and a critical analysis of its impact.
backs, Crest Paperbacks, Winston Press, BFA Educational Media, W.B. Saunders
(Professional Books), and Neisa (Latin American and Spanish books). It also publishes
monthly magazines, including FImLD AND STREAM, ROAD AND TRACK, CYCLE WORLD,
WORLD TEINIS, SEA, PICKUP, VAN AND FOUR WD, MEcHAX ILLUSTRATED, and WoMEN's
DAY. In addition CBS publishes about 55 magazines that appear annually and semi-
annually.
The New York Times Company is a newspaper publisher that has expanded into
magazines, books, and broadcasting. The New York Times publishes the following
newspapers: International Herald Tribune (Paris) (one third-ownership); the New
York Times; six dailies in Florida: Gainesville Sun, Lakeland Ledger, Ocala Star-
Banner, Leesburg Daily Commercial, Palatka Daily News, Lake City Reporter; and
three dailies in North Carolina: Lexington Dispatch, Hendersonville Times-News,
Wilmington Star News. In addition, the New York Times Company publishes four
Florida weeklies. The company also publishes the following magazines: FAMILY CmCLE,
AUSTRALIAN FAMILY CIRCLE, GOLF DIGEST, GOLF WoRLD (United Kindgom), TENNM
(United Kingdom), TENNm, and US. It owns WREG-TV in Memphis and WQXR-Anm
radio in New York City. The New York Times Co. owns Amo Press, Inc., Cambridge
Book Co., and Quadrangle New York Times Book Co.
Time, Inc. is a magazine publisher that expanded into books, newspapers, and
broadcasting. Time, Inc. publishes TME, FORTUNE, MONEY, SPORTS ILLUsTRATD, and
PEOPLE. It owns Little, Brown and Co., Time-Life Books, New York Graphic Society,
and is part owner of publishers in Germany, France, Spain, Mexico, and Japan. The
acquisition by Time, Inc. of the Book of the Month Club is pending. Time, Inc.
publishes 17 weekly newspapers in Chicago suburbs. It owns WOTV (Grand Rapids,
Michigan), Manhattan Cable TV, Home Box Office, Time-Life Films, and it possesses
a TV production division. America's Press, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, August 15,
1977, at 27. These companies, it can modestly be asserted, play a huge role in shaping
our country's collective consciousness.
A non-partisan study of the 1976 Ford-Carter presidential debates conducted by
Notre Dame psychology professor Lloyd Sloan helps illustrate the tremendous influ-
ence wielded by the communications media over the public's political perceptions.
Professor Sloan divided his test subjects into three groups. One group watched only
the October 6 debate. Another watched that debate and the post debate commentary
on CBS. The third watched the debate and the ABC post debate segment. Professor
Sloan recorded an overall shift of 20% in favor of Ford among those in the group
watching only the debate. The group watching the debate and the CBS commentary
shifted 27% for Carter. The group watching the debate and the ABC commentary
shifted 22% for Carter. Phillips, supra at 30.
1 Such convenient silence is not a novel behavior pattern. In 1975, when the FCC
adopted a set of cross-ownership rules disliked by the powers of the communications
industry, news coverage of the decision was scanty. One study of eighteen major cross-
owned daily newspapers found that only ten mentioned the ruling at all. Only three
noted the relationship with local broadcast stations. Gormley, supra note 5, at 42.
Stephen Barnett, a law professor at the University of California at Berkeley, has
termed news coverage of the entire FCC hearing and rule-making process a "media
blackout." Barnett, The FCC's Nonbatttle Against Media Monopoly, COLUM. JOURNAL-
iSM REv. 44, 47 (Jan./ Feb. 1973).
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I. THE PROBLEM OF CROSS-OWNERSHIP'0 '
The current trend in this country is toward greater concen-
tration of control" of the means of communications in the
hands of fewer and fewer people. An exemplary study' 2 found
that one of every six television stations was involved in a cross-
ownership relationship with a local newspaper.' 3 This pheno-
menon has concerned a number of thoughtful writers," and
statements by the Supreme Court indicate that it is aware of
the problem.15
The concentration of media ownership also has been a
matter of serious concern to legislators, both Democrats and
" For general discussions of the problem, see H. LEvINE, supra note 5, at 74-86. A
popularly-written account of the controversy, with a pro-industry slant, is contained
in M. SEIDEN, WHO CoNTRoLS THE MASS MEDIA (1974). See also Johnson and Hoak,
supra note 5.
" It is important to note that technical ownership is not as important a considera-
tion as actual working control. In other contexts, the FCC has recognized this distinc-
tion. See, e.g., notes 1 and 2 to 47 C.F.R. § 73.35 (1974) ("actual working control in
whatever manner exercised"; ownership of 51% of the stock not necessary to bring the
multiple ownership regulations into effect).
22 Howard, 51 JouRNAusM Q. 715, 717 (1974).
,3 The concentration of ownership of newspapers and broadcasting stations is even
more alarming when considered against the background of a continuing decrease in the
number of independent newspapers. After pointing out in 1973 that newspaper chains
were buying up their independent competitors at the rate of 62 per year, journalist Ben
H. Bagdikian went on to say "[a]t this rate (allowing for leap years), the last indepen-
dent will disappear at 10:48 p.m. on June 7 eleven years hence-appropriately a Thurs-
day, a fat advertising day, and also appropriately, in the year 1984." Bagdikian, The
Myth of Newpaper Poverty, COLUM. JOtRNASM RV. 20 (March/April 1973).
It has been asserted that a pattern of blatant violations of the antitrust laws is
the single most important factor in this demise of daily newspapers in this country.
See Barnett, Media Monopoly and Democracy, THE NATION, Jan. 15, 1973, at 79. See
also Roberts, Antitrust Problems in the Newspaper Industry, 82 HARv. L. REv. 319
(1968).
" See, e.g., Bagdikian, The Media Monopolies, PROGREssivE 31 (June, 1978).
,5 See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249 (1974).
Claims of newspapers, national newspapers, national wire and news
services, and one-newspaper towns, are the dominant features of a press that
has become noncompetitive and enormously powerful and influential in its
capacity to manipulate popular opinion and change the course of
events....
The elimination of competing newspapers in most of our large cities, and
the concentration of control of media that results from the only newspaper
being owned by the same interests which own a television station and a radio
station, are important components of this trend toward concentration of
control of outlets to inform the public.
MEDIA OWNERSHIP
Republicans, liberals and conservatives." The Federal Com-
munications Commission's (FCC) refusal to act decisively
against media concentration,'7 despite near-unanimous con-
demnation on the part of everyone except those with vested
interests in the present system, is a tribute to the lobbying
finesse'" and political clout'9 of the communications industry.
Excessive concentration of control of communications has
two different types of adverse effects: informational and eco-
nomic. The combined impact of these consequences creates
enormous power for cross-owners, and generates distrust
among the public.
A. Informational Restraint
It is eminently reasonable to assume that "ownership of
the media affects the content of the media":"0 owners inevita-
bly will exercise a measure of control, intentional or uninten-
tional, overtly"' or subtly, over content. One astute commenta-
tor has pointed out several ways in which cross-ownership can
affect adversely news reporting and editorializing because of
the owner's self-interest.2 First, the cross-owner's financial in-
" See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 9, at 44 (quoting 1969 statements by both Spiro
Agnew and Hubert Humphrey).
17 For an interesting discussion of the intensely political nature of decision-making
at the FCC, including a number of revealing case studies, see E. KEASNOW & L.
LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION (1973).
Is For an entertaining and enlightening description of industry lobbying tactics,
see B. COLE AND M. OgrrINGER, RELUCTANT REGULATORS: TaE FCC AND THE BROADCAST
AUDIENCE, 36-49 (1978).
1, Concern about the excessive concentration of political power in the communica-
tions industry is not a new concern. During the debates on the Radio Act of 1927,
Congressman Luther A. Johnson of Texas pointed out, "When .. .a single selfish
group is permitted to either tacitly or otherwise acquire ownership and dominate these
broadcasting stations throughout the country, then woe be to those who dare to differ
with them." 67 CONG. REc. 558 (1926).
2s Johnson and Hoak, supra note 5, at 267.
21 A classic example of overt owner control which adversely affects the public
interest was detailed in Barnett, supra note 9, at 49. After Rotert Kennedy's assassina-
tion, a San Francisco newspaper columnist wrote a column urging the newspaper's
readers to complain to the FCC about television violence. Because of the newspaper's
affiliation with a local television station, the column was censored. It is interesting to
note during a license renewal proceeding of the television station involved, the hearing
examiner struck the columnist's testimony on the ground that such inquiry into news-
paper editorial policies would violate the first amendment. Id.
21 Barnett, A Critique of, and Supplement to, the Prospective Reports of th Rand
Corporation at 17-18, filed in FCC Docket No. 18110 (Sept. 23, 1974).
1978-79]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
terest will prevent any criticism by one of his outlets against
another. Second, given the family ties between the outlets,
neither will be willing to correct any abuses of the other. Fi-
nally, to the extent his outlets reflect his viewpoints, the public
will be exposed to similar treatment of news.
One massive studys of 214 newspapers and television sta-
tions in 77 cities found that cross-owned newspapers were more
likely to engage in practices that result in less diversity of cov-
erage. 24 These practices include: (1) sharing of carbon copies of
stories scheduled for publication between newspaper and tele-
vision station news departments; (2) transfer of newspaper re-
porters or editors to the news department of a cross-owned
television station; and (3) the utilization of the same physical
plant for both the newspaper and television station. The same
study found that "cross-ownership contributes to news homo-
geneity by aggravating an already disturbing tendency for re-
porters to cover stories because other reporters are covering
them-the familiar problem of 'pack journalism." '25 Even if
such practices are not "abuses," they "nevertheless [belie]
assurances by owners of newspaper-television combinations
that their news staffs [function] separately and indepen-
dently. '21
Other not-so-innocuous practices can affect adversely the
flow of information in a community where cross-ownership ex-
ists. Consider San Francisco a few years ago, where
Hearst stations considered the interest of Hearst newspapers
in selecting controversial programs. Proposed materials of
"doubtful" or "political" complexion were subject to check-
' Gormley sent questionnaires to 349 managing editors and news directors of both
cross-owned and separately owned newspapers and TV stations (214 responded). He
then visited ten cross-ownership cities and interviewed forty-four news executives and
reporters. He also evaluated 9,335 news stories to compare the coverage overlap of
cross-ownership and separately owned sets of newspapers and TV stations. For the
complete study, see W. Gormley, THE EFFECTS OF NEWSPAPER-TELEVISION CROSS-
OWNERSHIP ON NEWS HoMoGENErY (Institute for Social Research, University of North
Carolina, 1976).
2 Gormley found that "common ownership of a newspaper and a television station
in the same city does tend to restrict the variety of news available to the public-and,
further, that the homogenizing effects of cross-ownership are most noticeable in
smaller cities." Gormley, supra note 5, at 39.




up and consultation between both ends of the radio-
newspaper empire. For example, Hearst newspaper and radio
officials co-operated to secure the cancellation of a nightly
[pro-Union] program over KYA (San Francisco), apparently
because Hearst's San Francisco Examiner feared that the
program would hurt its advertising accounts.Y
The situation in Bluefield, West Virginia, is another clas-
sic example of the concentration of ownership of the communi-
cation media. In that town, one family controlled every media
outlet except one AM radio station.2 Similarly disturbing is
the case of Topeka, Kansas. In that city, Stauffer Publications
owns the only daily newspapers, the only commercial VHF
television station, and WIBW-AM-FM radio stations.2 9 Cross-
ownership in Topeka has resulted in distrust of anything that
appears in the press. "People here don't trust the papers be-
cause they know they're the only ones."30
A further adverse effect caused by the informational re-
straint of media concentration is a legitimate fear of the politi-
cal power which can be exerted by those concentrations. One
thoughtful article" has summarized this concern succinctly:
In our modern society, political power has more and
more come to be measured in terms of access to the mass
media. The prevention of excessive concentrations of political
power in the hands of a few individuals is an important rea-
son for preventing media concentration. The excessive power
of the media in the United States is demonstrated by their
ability to obtain passage for essentially any single piece of
legislation they desire in Congress. Exercising a faucet-like
control of information given to.the people, the media influ-
ence and control legislation, candidates, and political ideas.
The effects are felt from the United States Congress and Pres-
" Levin, supra note 5, at 29-30 (footnotes omitted). In another incident, a newspa-
per reporter for the Chronicle alleged that he was told to downplay an expose"which
rnight have offended local politicians because an affiliated broadcast station had cable
TV interests in the area-which were vulnerable to political pressure. Zuckman and
Mason, The Great Cross-Media Ownership Controversy, 60 A.B.A.J. 1570, 1573 (1974).
n Elliot, Single Control of TV, Newspaper in One City Faces Increasing Fire, Wall
St. J., July 23, 1974 at 1, col. 1.
2, Pincus, Quality News: What Difference Does Ownership Make? THE NEw
REPUBLIC, May 18, 1974, at 15.
11 Id. at 16.
31 Johnson and Hoak, supra note 5, at 276.
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ident down through local politics. The media can determine
the issues for national debate, choose the spokesman, control
the time allocated to them, and indicate their positions. Even
more insidious than their power to promote certain issues is
the power to exclude others-all with little accountability to
the people affected by their decisions.2
It is clear that an increase in the number of voices would be a
desirable step toward the vigorous, wide-ranging public debate
that is an integral part of a democratic society.
B. Economic Impact
The second disadvantage inherent in cross-ownership is
the adverse antitrust effect. The economic abuses cited by crit-
ics of cross-ownership involve competitive advantages avail-
able to owners of newspaper-broadcast combinations in local
marketplaces. It has been argued that many newspaper acquis-
itions of broadcast stations were violations of the antitrust laws
from the outset and thus FCC approval and renewal of such
licenses was and is illegal." But the Commission has taken the
position that it is not responsible for enforcing "antitrust or
other laws relating to unfair trade practices" though it may
"take cognizance" of such statutes in applying its "public in-
terest" standard.3 4
Although some industry spokesmen have suggested that
any divestiture necessary should be left to the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Justice Department, this approach "is a poor alter-
native to incorporation of antitrust considerations into FCC
regulations. The FCC maintains at least periodic scrutiny over
broadcast media through its licensing procedure, and all ac-
quisitions and mergers involving a broadcast outlet are subject
11 Id. at 275-76.
Bennett, Media Concentration and the FCC: Focusing with a Section Seven
Lens, 66 Nw. U. L. REv. 159, 186-87 (1971). See also Comment, Antitrust-"Cross-
Media" Ownership and the Antitrust Laws-A Critical Analysis and a Suggested
Solution, 47 N.C. L. Rav. 794 (1967).
3 Sakes Tarzian, Inc., 23 F.C.C.2d 221, 222 (1970). For the Supreme Court's
statement on the issue, see United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334
(1959) (while FCC does not have power to resolve antitrust issues, it may consider




to FCC public interest scrutiny." 35
There are several ways that cross-owners can assert their
economic power in the local market to gain an unfair advantage
over competitors. For example, the television station owned by
the Kansas City Star refused to accept advertising from mer-
chants who had not purchased advertising space in the parent
newspaper.3" Similarly, the Bloomington Courier Tribune in
Indiana offered "Certificates of Broadcast Credit" to mer-
chants who purchased a specified amount of newspaper space.
The certificates entitled their holders to reduced rates for valu-
able advertising time on the three broadcast stations owned by
the newspaper's parent company.37 In both cases, and many
others, 3 newspapers that owned broadcast stations were able
to use unfairly their more powerful bargaining position with
local advertisers to gain an advantage over their journalistic
competitors in the quest for vital advertising revenues.39 The
antitrust problems underlying cross-ownership, when consid-
ered with the more significant negative effects on the free flow
of information, make it imperative that some action be taken
to sever these combinations.
II. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION v. NATIONAL
CITIZEN'S COMMITTEE FOR BROADCASTING
A. Background
The Federal Communications Commission has said, al-
most from its inception, that it deemed it important to prevent
3 Comment, Media Cross-Ownership-The FCC's Inadequate Response, 54 TEx.
L. REv. 336, 345 (1976). See also, Barrow, Antitrust and the Regulated Industry,
Promoting Competition in Broadcasting, 1964 DuKE L.J. 282, 283.
3, Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 656 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 923 (1957).
1 Sakes Tarzian, Inc., 23 F.C.C.2d 221 (1970).
13 See generally Comment, Diversification and the Public Interest: The Adminis-
trative Responsibility of the FCC, 66 YALE L.J. 365 (1957).
1, A related abuse concerns the refusal of newspapers which hold television proper-
ties to carry or carry in full the listings of competing television stations. One bankrupt
UHF station in the Dallas-Fort Worth area claimed that three local media cross-
ownerships refused it equal program listings, in some denying it any newspaper listing
at all. Comment, supra note 35, at 363-64. The resulting antitrust suit was subse-
quently settled for $535,000: see Healy, Station Owner Awarded One-Half Million for
Papers' TV Listing Ban, EDrrOR & PumsHER, Feb. 9, 1974, at 9.
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concentration of media control. 0 The Commission has sought
to achieve diversity in the critically important marketplace of
ideas by regulating media ownership. All television and radio
broadcast stations must be licensed by the Federal Communi-
cations Commission,41 such licensing being determined by
whether the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" will
be served thereby.42 The policy of the Commission has been
that diversification of ownership serves the "public interest,
convenience, and necessity" because it results in the airing of
diverse viewpoints.
However, despite an early case that seemed to indicate
that cross-ownership was not in the public interest, 3 "[b]y
1941, of 111 cities having one newspaper and one radio station,
in 87 the newspapers owned or controlled the broadcast facility.
And as of June 30, 1941, 43 of 99 FM applications had been
filed by newspapers."44
Although "[iln the early 1940's, the Commission consid-
ered adopting rules barring common ownership of local news-
papers and radio stations,"45 in 1951 the Commission decided
not to adopt a per se rule and instead to consider the matter
on a case-by-case basis when licenses were issued or renewed. 6
11 For a brief history of FCC cross-ownership policy, see R. BUNCE, TELEmSION IN
THE CoRPoRATr INTEEST, 46-51 (1976). See also Kielbowiez, Discrimination or Discrimi-
nating Licensing: FCC Policy and Newspaper Ownership of T. V. Stations, 1945-1970,
30 ADMIN. L. REV. 423 (1978).
One of the earliest court tests of the FCC's authority was National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1934), which arose as the broadcasting networks
challenged the validity of FCC regulations designed to promote more diverse program-
ming, if not diversity of ownership, among local radio stations.
" 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
,2 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 309(a) (1970).
,3 Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 5 F.C.C. 117 (1938).
" Toohey, Newspaper Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 20 FED. Com. BAR J. 44,
47 (1966). For a discussion of the historical pattern of the trend toward cross-ownership
and its causes, see LaviN, supra note 5, at 39-73. See also Sterling, Newspaper Owner-
ship of Broadcast Stations, 1920-1968, 46 JOURNAUSM Q. 227, 228 (1969).
45 FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 781 n.4 (1978).
" Id. However, diversification of ownership has not been the only factor relevant
to the public interest, convenience, and necessity. Factors that are taken into account
when considering applicants for a license have included the extent to which local
ownership is integrated with management, proposed programming, past broadcast
record, and the character of the applicant. In this regard, the Commission attempts
to obtain "the best practicable service to the public." Policy statement on Compara-
tive Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394 (1965). See, e.g., FCC v. Allentown
[Vol. 67
1978-791 MEDIA OWNERSHIP
In pursuit of diversification, the Commission has been willing
to order divestiture, and its inherent power to do so to imple-
ment sound policy has not been questioned seriously. 7 Divesti-
ture is consistent with the notion that a licensee has no vested
right to its license beyond the typical three year term.49 To say
that the Commission has the power to order divestiture is
merely another way of saying the Commission has the power
to license or not to license, which authority it clearly possesses.
The Commission began a formal rulemaking procedure in
1970 "to consider the need for a more restrictive policy toward
newspaper ownership of radio and television broadcast sta-
tions. '5 The Commission proposed rules "that would eliminate
Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955), in which this consideration was raised, al-
though it was not a decisive factor.
Despite a 1951 FCC policy statement that antitrust violations would be a consider-
ation in determining license fitness, the Commission almost immediately approved a
license transfer to a party with 198 pending antitrust actions. Perry, Current Antitrust
Problems in Broadcasting, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1966).
,7 Congress has, however, seen fit to grant a tax break to licensees forced to
effectuate FCC policy. A 1944 amendment to the Internal Revenue Code permits
licensees who are forced to divest to defer capital gains by treating the transactions as
involuntary conversions. Revenue Act of 1943, § 123, 58 Stat. 44 (1944), 26 U.S.C. §
112(m); now 26 U.S.C. § 1071. (1970). See H.R. REP. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.
49 (1944).
Is A prime example of the success of industry spokesmen in setting the terms of
debate is the constant use of the term "divestiture" by the Commission in the Second
Report & Order. "Divestiture," according to the FCC, "is a harsh remedy, one to be
reserved [sic] only where the need is overwhelming and the evidence unambiguous."
Second Report & Order, at 1083. But "divestiture," in this context, is, as Chief Judge
Bazelon noted, a misnomer:
It implies that the broadcaster has that which the Communications Act
specifically states he does not have-an interest in the license beyond its
expiration date-and that he is being forcibly deprived of a vested right. A
licensee must apply for renewal every three years and the Commission is to
grant renewal only if it finds it is in the public interest to do so.
National Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Throughout the hearings, the Commission seems to have accepted as given that
cross-owners had a right to renewal of their broadcast licenses. This assumption was
fatal to those who sought a break up of the combinations.
"0 FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940) (license not a
property right); 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 304, 307, 309 (h) (1970). Section 304 specifically
provides that applicants for licenses must sign waivers of any claim to the use of a
particular frequency. Section 309(h) provides that every license must contain a state-
ment that the license is subject to the condition that no right to use the designated
frequency beyond the term of the license vests in the licensee.
" FCC v. Nat'l Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 783 (1978). The
FCC's rule-making activity provoked a great deal of discussion. See Mills, Moynahan,
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all newspaper-broadcast combinations serving the same mar-
ket, by-prospectively banning formation or transfer of such
combinations and requiring dissolution of all existing combina-
tions within five years."5 The Commission pointed out that the
most significant aspect of the problem was the common control
of television stations and newspapers of general circulation,
since the public looks to these two sources for its news and
information on public affairs. 52
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking stirred a hornet's
nest. The newspaper broadcast industries activated their pow-
erful lobbying machinery into high gear. By the time the hear-
ings were half completed (1973), one industry organization
alone spent more than $300,000 for cross-ownership defense by
hiring former FCC Commissioner Lee Loevinger to represent it
in the hearings.53 Such a blitzkreig could well be expected to
result in a mismatch for an agency criticized for its inadequate
staff and resources.54 Newspaper or broadcast interests predict-
ably opposed the formulation of any rules in the area. The
Antitrust Division of Justice Department and a handful of pub-
lic interest groups,55 led by the Washington-based National
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,56 filed comments favor-
ing the formulation of rules which would bar cross-ownership.
Perlini & McClure, The Constitutional Considerations of Multiple Media Ownership
Regulation by the Federal Communications Commission, 24 AM. U. L. REv. 1217
(1975); Note, The Power of the FCC to Regulate Newspaper-Broadcast Cross-
Ownership: The Need for Congressional Clarification, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1708 (1977);
Note, Diversity Ownership in Broadcasting: Affirmative Policy in Search of an Author,
27 U. FLA. L. REV. 502 (1975); Comment, A Primer on Docket 18110: The New FCC
Cross-Ownership Rules, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 584 (1976); Comment, supra note 35; Com-
ment, supra note 5.
5, FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 784 (1978) (citing
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Docket No. 18110), 22 F.C.C.2d 339, 346
(1970)).
52 Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.2d 339, 344-46 (1970).
See Barnett, supra note 9, at 45.
5, See Johnson & Dystel, A Day in the Life: The Federal Communications
Commission, 82 YALE L.J. 1575, 1623 (1973).
" For general discussions of public interest groups active in the communications
field, see B. COLE and M. OMTTINGER, supra note 18, and D. GuiNARY, CITIZENS' GRouPs
AND BROADCASTING (1975).
" The National Association of Broadcasters is the industry lobbying group rep-
senting more than 4,000 radio and television stations with a $3,000,000 annual budget
and a staff of about 100. Its office is only a few blocks from the FCC. E. KRASNOW &
L. LONSLEY, supra note 17, at 34.
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On January 31, 1975, the Commission finally acted.5 7 In
short, the Commission rules were of surprisingly limited effect.
57 Amendment of §§ 74.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating
to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, Second
Report & Order (Docket No. 18110), 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975). [hereinafter cited as
Second Report & Order]. See generally, Note, The Power of the FCC to Regulate
Newspaper-Broadcast Cross-Ownership: The Need for Congressional Clarification, 75
MICH. L. REv. 1708 (1977). Comment, supra note 35; Comment, A Primer on Docket
18110: The New FCC Cross-Ownership Rules, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 584 (1976).
An interesting sidelight to this whole affair is the dilatory tactics undertaken by
the communications industry lobby which repeatedly requested, and was granted by
the FCC, delays which extended the proceedings from 1968 to 1975. See Barnett, supra
note 9, at 44-46. It has been suggested that one objective of this delay was to postpone
a decision until the expiration of the term of FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson,
an outspoken foe of cross-ownership. Id. at 46. Johnson's term expired in June 1974;
the report on cross-ownership was released in January 1975.
From the time that the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was issued in
1970, the Commission deferred all renewal challenges based upon claims that cross-
ownership was not in the public interest. The cases deferred include: Chronicle Broad-
casting Co., 40 F.C.C.2d 775 (1973) (San Francisco); Radio Ohio, Inc., 38 F.C.C.2d 721
(1973) (Columbus, Ohio) aff'd in Columbus Broadcasting Coalition v. FCC, 505 F.2d
320 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 31 F.C.C.2d 1090 (1971)
(Memphis, Tenn.); Evening Star Broadcasting Co., 27 F.C.C.2d 316 (1971) (Washing-
ton, D.C.) aff'd in Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Midwest Radio-TV,
Inc. 24 F.C.C.2d 625 (1970) (Minneapolis-St. Paul); Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (Salt Lake City); Federation of Citizens Ass'ns, 21 F.C.C.2d 12 (1969)
(Washington, D.C.).
In Columbus Broadcasting Coalition, the challengers maintained that the long
delay in promulgating a rule justified the court's stepping in to decide the case on the
merits rather than further deferring to the Commission's repeated decisions to defer.
The court agreed that four years was a long time but it also recognized that the
problem was complex. The challengers were denied rehearing en banc but five of the
nine active judges joined in an opinion which chastized the Commission for not acting,
stating "we expect the Commission to issue its cross-ownership policy within the year;
if it is not, [we are] presently of the view that this Court must eventually rule on its
de facto policy." 505 F.2d 320, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The rules were finally promulgated
early the next year.
The Anti-trust Division of the Justice Department was pressuring the FCC to
bring the matter to a conclusion. The Department claimed that in Des Moines, one
company received 100% of the newspaper advertising revenues and 37% of the local
television advertising revenues. In St. Louis, two cross-owners received 80% of the
area's available advertising revenues.
It is interesting to note that the impetus for the promulgation of cross-ownership
rules by the FCC originated not with that agency, but with the Justice Department.
In August 1968, the Department filed a twenty-six page memorandum with the Com-
mission "calling for a rapid end to cross-ownership combinations in single markets. See
Sterling, supra note 44.
A former FCC Commissioner turned lobbyist for the broadcast industry, Lee Loe-
vinger, has strongly attacked the Justice Department's activism in this field. "[Wihat
the Department of Justice is doing in this instance is abusing legal process, or, if you
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The rules did ban the future creation of co-located newspaper-
broadcast combinations by prohibiting a newspaper owner
from acquiring a license for a co-located broadcast station, ei-
ther by transfer or by original licensing. Furthermore, any
broadcast licensee who acquired a daily newspaper in the same
market was required to dispose of it within a year or by the time
of its renewal, whichever came later.-" The rules, however,
"grandfathered" the existing combinations, meaning that al-
most all already existing combinations were undisturbed. Di-
vestiture for existing combinations was considered appropriate
only in those "egregious" cases in which one entity had an
"effective monopoly in the local marketplace of ideas,"59 by
possessing simultaneous control over the local daily paper and
the broadcast stations. 0 As a practical matter, this meant that
only eight television/newspaper combinations and ten
radio/newspaper combinations in the nation's smallest mar-
kets6' were ordered to divest.'?
prefer, trying to blackmail the FCC into following the course that the Department of
Justice thinks it should follow. And I submit that this is improper." Loevinger,
Antitrust and Regulated Industries: Collision Course?: Communictions, 43 ANTIrrRUST
L.J. 359, 366 (1974). Other broadcast industry partisans have referred to Justice De-
partment personnel interested in promoting diversification as "mad dogs." Zuckman
& Mason, supra note 27, at 1570. More objective observers would say that the Justice
Department is merely responding to fill a vacuum created by the FCC's failure to move
expeditiously. See generally, B. COLE & M. OErrINoG, supra note 18.
Even Congress was growing impatient. See, e.g., H.R. 12993, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974) (requiring FCC not to consider ownership of other stations unless the Commis-
sion has adopted rules prohibiting such ownership interests); H.R. REP. No. 961, 93d.
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. REP. No. 1190, 93d. Cong., 2d. Sess. 14-15, 22 (1974) (action
required on Docket No. 18110 by end of calendar year). See also 30 CONoRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY ALMANAc 714-17 (1974) for a summary of Congressional action.
Second Report and Order at 1074; 1099-1107.
Id. at 1080-81.
The rules provided that divestiture was required only where there was common
ownership of the sole daily newspaper published in a community and either (1) the
sole broadcast station or (2) the sole television station. Radio and television were thus
accorded a little bit different treatment in that the presence of a television station
would exempt a radio-newspaper combination but the presence of a radio station
would not exempt a television-newspaper combination. Id. at 1080-84.
11 It has been pointed out that "[tihe stations and newspapers in these localities
are likely to be small, marginal operations where independent ownership may not be
possible." Note, supra note 50, at 512. A cynic might suggest that the real reason
divestiture was to be required of the smaller combinations is that they lacked the power
to dominate the FCC's deliberations as completely as did their larger brothers.
2 The Commission was compassionate enough to provide for waivers of both the
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On petitions for reconsideration, the Commission reaf-
firmed its rules and policies.13 In so doing, the Commission
rejected industry arguments that no rules in this area were
appropriate and at the same time rejected the arguments of the
Justice Department and the National Citizens Committee for
Broadcasting that the divestiture order was far too narrow. The
Commission, in walking this line, maintained simultaneously
that commonly owned media do not provide diversity (thus
justifying some rules) and that the diversity goal should yield
if it caused excessive disruption or hardship (thus justifying the
narrow divestiture order)."4 The Commission had adopted the
rhetoric of opponents of cross-ownership, while tailoring its ac-
tions to conform with newspaper-broadcast industry desires.
The order was appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia. 5 Appeals came from all
directions," but one has to believe that the industry appeals
were mostly cosmetic. After all, the divestiture order affected
only minor combinations in small cities and the prospective
ban was, for all practical purposes, purely academicY.7 The
court, in an extraordinary opinion, affirmed the prospective
prospective ban and the divestiture requirement in exceptional cases. Second Report
and Order at 1076 n.24, 1077, 1085. In fact, waivers were granted sua sponte to one
television-newspaper combination in Hickory, North Carolina, and one radio-
newspaper combination in Brookfield, Missouri, leaving only 16 affected combinations
nationwide. Under the rules, absent a waiver, divestiture had to occur by January 1,
1980. Id. at 1084-86.
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 53 F.C.C.2d 589 (1975).
" Id. at 592.
Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
' See generally Comment, 82 DICK. L. Rv. 193 (1978); Comment, 1978 Wis. L.
REv. 269 (1978). A literal race to the courthouse door had followed the FCC's announce-
ment. The NCCB, anxious to have the appeal heard in Judge Bazelon's District of
Columbia circuit, had their notice of appeal stamped at 2:48 p.m. on January 31, 1975,
within minutes of the official announcement. The Odgen Newspapers of Wheeling,
West Virginia were close behind, with their notice of appeal being stamped in the
Fourth Circuit shortly after 3:00 p.m. See BROADCASTnNG 70 (Feb. 10, 1975).
" The National Association of Broadcasters, the group which is roughly to the
broadcasting industry what the American Newspaper Publishers Association is to the
newspaper industry, admitted to the Commission that "a prospective ban would be
purely academic." Brief for Petitioner, at 35 n.2, National Citizens Comm. v. FCC,
555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977). As Commissioner Robinson observed: "[11n most of the
markets involving newspaper-television station ownership, the stations have been com-
monly owned since the time of the original license. There was no reason to believe that
voluntary dissolutions would occur with any regularity in the future." Id.
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ban but vacated the rules dealing with existing combinations,
holding that a broader divestiture was required under law. 8
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
1. The Prospective Ban
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and rein-
stated the rules as the Commission had adopted them. With
respect to the rule prohibiting future cross-ownership, the
Court rejected several arguments by the media petitioners. The
Court first noted that the Commission had not exceeded its
statutory authority, as had been argued. 9 The Court then re-
jected the argument that evidence was needed which would
indicate that the Commission's rules would in fact lead to di-
versity. Agreeing with the court of appeals, the Court noted
that the rules were a rational method of achieving diversity
despite the inconclusiveness of the record. 70 Similarly, the
Court rejected the argument that the Commission had based
its rules on a diversification policy to the exclusion of other
factors. The Court noted that the Commission's "change in
policy was a reasonable administrative response to changed
circumstances in the broadcasting industry." 7' The Court also
rejected constitutional arguments made by the broadcasting
industry. Noting that "there is no 'unabridgeable First Amend-
ment right to broadcast,"' 72 and the "physical limitations of
the broadcast spectrum,"73 the Court found "nothing in the
First Amendment to prevent the Commission from allocating
licenses so as to promote the 'public interest."'74 In response to
the contention that the regulations "unconstitutionally condi-
tioned the receipt of a broadcast license upon forfeiture of the
right to publish a newspaper, 7 5 the Court noted that this kind
of prohibition does not violate the first amendment since the
regulations are not "content related" and its purpose "is to
U Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 966 (1977).
" 436 U.S. at 793-94.
7o Id. at 796.
71 Id. at 797.
72 Id. at 799 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,388 (1969)).
11 436 U.S. at 799.
7' Id.
71 Id. at 800.
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promote free speech, not to restrict it." 7 Moreover, newspapers
are not 'singled out' for more stringent treatment than other
applicants;" they are treated in the same "fashion as other
owners of the major media . . . [are] . . . treated under the
Commission's multiple-ownership rules. '77
2. The Divestiture Rules
In "reinstat[ing] the portion of the Commission's order
that was invalidated by the Court of Appeals, ' 78 the Court
reiterated the Commission's reasons for not ordering sweeping
divestiture:
[T]he stability and continuity of meritorious service pro-
vided by the newspaper owners as a group would be lost;
owners who had provided meritorious service would unfairly
be denied the opportunity to continue in operation;
"economic dislocations" might prevent new owners from ob-
taining sufficient working capital to maintain the quality of
local programming, and local ownership of broadcast stations
would probably decrease.7"
The Court was unwilling to find "that the Commission acted
irrationally in concluding that these public interest harms out-
weighed the potential gains that would follow from increased
diversification of ownership."80
The validity of these arguments is highly questionable.
The Court agreed with the Commission that the stability and
continuity of the service provided by the newspaper owners
would be lost because divestiture would disturb continuity of
operation. The new owners "would lack the long knowledge of
the community and would have to begin raw.""' Yet absolutely
no evidence appeared in the trial record to indicate that divest-
itures would result in disruptions harmful to the public inter-
est. First, it appears that hold-overs in high level management
usually smooth the transition period. 82 Moreover, as the court




I Id. at 805.
82 Id. at 807, quoting from Second Report and Order at 1078.
82 Commissioner Robinson made this observation during the course of the proceed-
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of appeals noted, the Commission regularly approved license
transfers. If harmful disruptions do accompany changes in
ownership, how could the Commission justify its routine ap-
proval of voluntary transfer?" Neither the Court nor the Com-
mission bothered to cite any evidence to the effect that new
licensees would be inferior to existing licensees. In fact, if the
record indicated anything, it was that new owners were more
responsive to community needs." There was simply no evi-
dence in the record to support the contention that divestiture
posed a threat of harmful disruption. The position of the Court
and the Commission amounts to no more than continuity for
continuity's sake.
The concern of the Court and the Commission that owners
who had provided meritorious service would be denied unfairly
the opportunity to continue in operation indicates a profound
misunderstanding of the licensing scheme. A broadcaster has
no vested right to its license beyond its three year term. It is
difficult to discern the unfairness in failure to renew a license
if the public interest required that the license be awarded to
someone else. The reference of the Court and the Commission
to "legitimate renewal expectancies" which "should not be de-
stroyed without good cause""5 is a gratuitous introduction of a
notion not present in the statutory scheme.86 It indicates that
private rather than public interests are being protected. The
solicitude expressed for licensees who have personally profited
from owning broadcast stations is either incredibly naive or
ings. Second Report and Order at 1128.
" From 1969-1973, the Commission approved 165 voluntary television transfers,
many without even a hearing. It nowhere appears that the Commission was genuinely
concerned about the possibility of disrupted services in this context. See generally FCC
ANNUAL REPORTS [1969-1973] at 130, 143, 147, 167, 201.
" See, e.g., the testimony of James Alexander, Executive Director of FACT, Inc.
New Haven Conn., and the testimony of Nancy Schmidt, Chairwoman, St. Louis
Broadcast Coalition Brief of Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting at 36, FCC v. Nat'l
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978). Additionally, in the one known
instance where a newspaper license was replaced, the new licensee performed superla-
tively, airing locally produced shows in prime-time and receiving accolades for its
programming. See, e.g., Koch, WCVB: Carrying the Torch, 29 AccEss MAGAZMNE 12
(1976).
436 U.S. at 805 (quoting in part Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444
F.2d 841, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
11 Cf. Bennett, supra note 33, at 188-89 (disparaging reliance argument).
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reflects a conscious desire to serve the industry. In either case,
in the context of a regulatory scheme that encourages diversity,
the Court and the Commission should have been concerned
about the extent to which the existing licensees were prevent-
ing new competitors from entering the market.
The Court and the Commission each expressed concern
that broad-scaled divestiture "might" result in economic dislo-
cation which in turn "might" prevent new owners from obtain-
ing working capital to maintain the quality of local program-
ming." This theory assumes that, because of high interest
rates, new owners would have to devote a substantial portion
of revenues to debt service, leaving insufficient working capital
to finance local programming.88 That these not-so-mighty
"mights" would be offered with a straight face by the Commis-
sion as a reason for limiting divestiture is surprising; that they
should be accepted by the Court is shocking. Not only is it
highly speculative to say that divestiture might result in eco-
nomic dislocation, which might result in owners getting less
capital, which might result in the impairment of local program-
ming; these possibilities lack any support whatsoever in the
record. 9 Moreover, if the concern is legitimate, why has the
Commission expressly refused to consider it in the renewal
transfer contexts? °
Furthermore, the FCC itself had pointed out that the eco-
" 436 U.S. at 804.
uId. at 804 n.22.
81 Interestingly enough, this speculation first arose when the Commission summa-
rized the broadcaster's allegations. See Second Report and Order at 1078. It somehow
became the Commission's view.
One study found that cross-ownership played an insignificant role in preventing
newspaper and broadcast station failures. H. LLvn4, supra note 5, at 97. The cross-
owned stations are generally older and more stable, which may be explained by the
fact that newspaper owners were among the first to move into this new field and
selected the most profitable choice locations. Id. at 94. "The vast majority of cross-
owned stations are VHF network affiliates, a lucrative position that newspapers ac-
quired because of their early entrance into the community broadcast markets. Conse-
quently, although only eleven to twelve percent of the television stations are cross-
owned, they account for eighteen percent of the total daily television audience." Com-
ment, supra note 35, at 340. See also R. BuNcE, supra note 40, at 42-45.
" As a matter of policy, the Commission, until this time, steadfastly refused to
look at the amount or percentage of revenue a licensee reinvested into public service
broadcasting as an element of the public interest. See, e.g., Alianza Federal de
Mercedes v. FCC, 539 F.2d 732, 737-38 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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nomic loss to divestees could be minimized by having divesti-
ture occur over a five year period, allowing them to exchange
stations, thus reducing cross-ownership (although the level of
multiple ownership would remain high) and allowing the sellers
to take advantage of already existing significant tax advan-
tages.91 The FCC could also, as it has previously done, condi-
tion a license renewal on the proviso that the station be sold
within a stated time.92
The final concern of the Court and the Commission was
that across-the-board divestiture would probably result in the
decrease of local ownership of broadcast stations. In support of
this concern, both the Commission and the Court pointed out
that "roughly 75% of the existing co-located newspaper-
television combinations are locally owned. 9 3 Yet neither the
Court nor the Commission indicated to what extent these local
owners actually participated in the operation of the station.
Since the Commission has long taken the position that local
ownership is insignificant unless the local owners actually par-
ticipate in the day-to-day operation of the station," it is sur-
prising that the Commission, and the Court expressed such
deep concern for bare local ownership. Additionally, nothing in
the record indicated, as the court of appeals had astutely
noted, that local entrepreneurs will not find television an at-
tractive investment. 5 Since the Commission routinely ap-
proves voluntary sales to absentee buyers," this concern for
local ownership is perhaps not genuine. Nonetheless, the Court
concluded that it was reasonable for the Commission to con-
sider the decrease in local ownership as one of several factors
militating against divestiture of combinations that have been
in existence for many years.9
" Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket 18110, 22 F.C.C.2d 339, 347-
48 (1970).
92 See, e.g., Melody Music, Inc., 2 F.C.C.2d 958 (1966).
11 436 U.S. at 808.
" 1965 Policy Statement, 1 F.C.C.2d at 395.
555 F.2d at 964.
" See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief at 33, FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcast-
ing, 436 U.S. 755 (1978).
11 436 U.S. at 809.
Professor William Gormley has pointed out drawbacks in the local ownership goal
which the FCC thought so worthy of protection:
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The net result was that the Court found nothing in the
Communications Act, the first amendment, or the Commis-
sion's own policies that would require the Commission to pre-
sume that its diversification policy should be given controlling
weight. 8 This finding was made even though the commission
order had stated: "If our democratic society is to function,
nothing can be more important than insuring that there is a
free flow of information from as many divergent sources as
possible."9 According to the Court, such a presumption was
inconsistent with the Commission's policy of giving foremost
importance to the more general goal of providing the best prac-
ticable service to the public.1°s
Prior to this case, whenever the Commission was con-
fronted with the problem of weighing diversity against other
considerations comprising the best practicable service goal,
diversity won. In fact, in McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v.
F. C. C., 10 the Commission chose an applicant who would help
to achieve diversity rather than one who was superior in all
other respects.102 McClatchy was totally consistent with the
policy that diversity was the single most important factor in
selecting a licensee, while ranking past broadcast record a weak
sixth. Nonetheless, the Court here glibly concluded that the
diversification goal did not take precedence over the unfounded
fears of interrupted service, economic dislocation, and de-
creased local ownership.
As for the limited divestiture order itself, the Court re-
[E]ven if local ownership is generally desirable, local ownership and
cross-ownership may be a particularly pernicious combination. Perhaps local
owners do take a more active personal interest in the management of their
properties than absentee owners, and perhaps they have stronger beliefs
about the community's needs. But these factors increase the probability that
if the owner's properties include both a newspaper and a television station,
such personal priorities will be stamped on two major media as a result.
Gormley, supra note 5, at 40.
" 436 U.S. at 809.
Second Report and Order at 1079 (emphasis added).
"' 436 U.S. at 809-10.
101 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957).
112 But cf. Busterna, Diversity of Ownership as a Criterion in F.C.C. Licensing
Since 1965, 20 J. BROADCASTING 101 (1976) (if an applicant whose licensing would




quired divestiture in the most "egregious cases" or those of
"effective monopoly." "Some line had to be drawn"'' 3 and this
was as good a place as any, since it is "hardly unreasonable for
the Commission to confine divestiture to communities in which
there is common ownership of the only daily newspaper and
either the only television station or the only broadcast station
of any kind encompassing the entire community with a clear
signal."104 Under the Commission's Court-approved scheme,
only those combinations that constitute "effective monopolies"
are forced to divest. Yet the standard for defining "effective
monopoly" bears no reference to antitrust law, but rather to
whether there is any other media voice in the community.'05
Under this approach, which grandfathers any combination that
has less than 100% control of the market, every combination
except some in the very smallest markets are grandfathered.
Ironically, perhaps tragically, certain licensees required to di-
vest are not really as concentrated as some which are grand-
fathered. ' The point is subtle but it can not be overlooked: a
combination which provides 400,000 people with almost all
their news is surely more egregious than one which provides a
small community with all its news.0 7 The Commission ap-
proach, which requires divestiture only of "effective monopo-
lies," and which defines effective monopolies as those which
have 100% of the market, is irrational because it fails to achieve
the goal of putting diversified views in the marketplace of ideas
in any significant fashion.0 8 The limited divestiture scheme is,
" 436 U.S. at 814.
,o Id. at 814-15.
105 Under the Sherman Act, for example, a 76% monopoly has been determined
to be prima facie monopolistic. United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
,0' See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief at 47, FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcast-
ing, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (which compares, for example Albany, Georgia, with Elkhart,
Indiana, and points out that the more egregious combination is grandfathered).
W0 At least this quality is so according to criteria developed by the Rand Corpora-
tion for measuring concentration of control. Thus, for example, in Chronicle Broad-
casting Co., 40 F.C.C.2d 775, 782 (1973), the Commission found that 10% of the
population of the San Francisco market, or over 400,000 people, received their informa-
tion exclusively from the grandfathered Chronicle media outlets even though there
were other media voices in the city. Petitioner's Brief at 47, FCC v. Nat'l Citizens
Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
'I" NCCB suggested that a 30% concentration should warrant divestiture; Com-
missioner Robinson was willing to adopt a similar standard; the court of appeals
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in substance, a token concession to the importance of diversity.
The few combinations which may have to divest'0 ' will have but
little effect on the serious national problem of increasing con-
centration of ownership of the communications media.
CONCLUSION
The notion that the FCC should strive actively to promote
diversification of ownership, it appears, is a dead or at least
moribund letter. The Court, in stating that diversification of
ownership will be only a "secondary factor""0 in the licensing
scheme, has relegated a critically important policy to a position
whereby it can be neutralized by reference to such considera-
tions as the need for continuous service, the need to avoid
economic dislocation, and the desire to maintain high levels of
local ownership.
Since it so clearly appears that the Commission is unwill-
ing to rethink its divestiture policy, and since the Court has
spoken, the only chance for a rational communications law
policy"' is with Congress. One would hope that Congress,
which is currently redrafting the Communication Act, will re-
spond by resurrecting diversity prior to the arrival of 1984.1 12
However, there are practical difficulties in the way of such
reforms. The domination of the FCC by the communications
industry which has a vested interest in perpetuating the cur-
rent cross-ownership system has already been discussed. Many
thought that this type of approach would be feasible on remand. Brief for Nat'l Citi-
zens Comm. of Broadcasting at 48 n.64, FCC v. Nat'l Citizen's Comm. for Broadcast-
ing, 436 U.S. 755 (1978).
1f It appears, moreover, that these divestitures may never take place, given the
fact that the Commission has already granted two waivers and appears to be quite
willing to grant more.
436 U.S. at 809.
'" For a thought-provoking discussion of various alternatives to the current televi-
sion broadcast structure, see R. NoLL, M. PECK & J. McGowAN, ECONOMIC AsPECTS OF
TELEvISioN REGULA TON (1973).
I Although the Supreme Court's decision was a major defeat to opponents of
media monopoly, their struggle is continuing. NCCB Chairman Nicholas Johnson has
indicated his group will continue to challenge selected individual cross-ownerships at
license renewal time in a kind of "guerilla warfare." BROADCASTING 28 (June 19, 1978).
The first target of this case-by-case strategy reportedly will be Atlanta, where the Cox
newspaper chain owns the morning and evening newspapers, a TV station, AM and




observers have pointed out the enormous power held by this
particular special interest group over Congress itself, whose
members' fortunes rise and fall with the ebb and flow of public-
ity, good or bad.
Most of our politics is still state and local in scope. And,
increasingly, in many states and local communities, con-
gressmen and state and local officials are compelled to regard
that handful of media owners (many of whom are out-of-
state), rather than the electorate itself as their effective con-
stituency.113
"The real lobbying power of broadcasters does not lie in the
amount of money they may contribute to campaigns, nor even
in the power of their editorializing or formal endorsements. The
power lies in the discretion of the broadcaster ...."I"
With such power concentrated in the hands of a few, it is
little wonder that the tendency is to avoid doing anything that
will upset that powerful few. Ending cross-ownership will not
end that power, but it will disperse it, and be a step toward
controlling it. For a politician whose constituency is located in
a state or region dominated by such "media barons, 115 to move
toward divestiture will require no small measure of moral and
political courage. But just such courage is necessary to fulfill
the broad purposes of the first amendment"-to encourage the
continued airing of a multiplicity of viewpoints on the issues
of our time.
"I N. JOHNSON, How TO TALK BACK TO YOUR TELEVISION Sur 52-55 (1970). See also
E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, supra note 17, at 55-56.
' B. CoLE AND M. OETnNGER, supra note 18, at 41.
,5 See Johnson, The Media Barons and the Public Interest: An FCC Commis-
sioner's Warning, THE ATLANTIc, June 1968, at 51.
"I "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market-
place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance mono-
polization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee."
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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